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Abstract
This study examines whether the intergenerational transmission of human capital, measured
by intergenerational earnings mobility, is aﬀected by divorce. Using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, I ﬁnd that, with each additional year in a family involving a single or a step parent, the
earnings mobility between biological fathers and children rises and the mobility between mothers
and daughters falls. However, using either sibling ﬁxed eﬀects or instrumental variable estimation,
I ﬁnd that the association between family structure and father-child mobility is explained by se-
lection. These ﬁndings have two important implications. First, they imply that the increase in
father-son mobility observed in other studies can be explained by the rise in single and step parent
families over the same period. Second, these ﬁndings imply that the connection between fathers
and children would have been weak whether or not a divorce occurred, which does not support the
hypothesis that father absence is an important factor contributing to diﬀerences in child outcomes
across family structures.
JEL Codes: J62, J12
Keywords: intergenerational earnings mobility, family structure1 Introduction
According to Bumpass and Lu (2000), nearly half of all children born in the United States today will
experience a single or step parent family at some point in their childhood. These children are more
likely to drop out of high school and less likely to attend college (McLanahan & Bumpass, 1988;
Grogger & Ronan, 1995; Ginther & Pollak, 2000). Girls from single parent families are more likely
to become teen mothers (McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994) and boys from these family structures
are more likely to be idle – not working or in school – in their early twenties (Haveman & Wolfe,
1994; McLanahan, 1997). There is an active discussion in the sociological and economic literatures
about the mechanisms by which family structure aﬀects these children. One argument – the father-
absence hypothesis – is that having a non-resident biological father reduces access to the father’s
time, reduces the amount of time spent with any parent, reduces the amount of supervision, and
increases the level of stress in the child’s household (Popenoe, 1996; Murray, 1995). In this paper,
I look for support for the father-absence hypothesis by examining whether the intergenerational
transmission of human capital – proxied by intergenerational earnings mobility – is weaker in single
and step parent families.
Intergenerational earnings immobility, measured by the elasticity of child’s earnings with re-
spect to parent’s earnings, signiﬁes the importance of family background in determining a child’s
earnings.1 That which family earnings cannot explain is called intergenerational mobility. If fathers
have a diminished capacity to inﬂuence their children when they do not reside with them, which
could contribute to diﬀerences in child outcomes across family structures, mobility will be higher
in families with a non-resident father. However, because divorce is fraught with choices, mobility
could also be higher in single and step parent families if fathers who are less likely to inﬂuence their
children are also more likely to divorce. I address this selection issue in two ways. First, I examine
1This elasticity is often loosely referred to as the correlation between the parents’ and children’s earnings,
although this is only technically true if the variance of the parents’ and the children’s earnings distributions
are equal.
1sibling diﬀerences in single and step family experience using ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, I instrument
the number of years in a single or step parent family with the child’s exposure to no-fault divorce
laws. Using data on the earnings of parents and children from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), I ﬁnd that with each additional year in either a single-parent or step family, the earnings
mobility between biological fathers and their children rises, but that this association is explained
by selection into family structure. That is, the connection between fathers and children would have
been weak whether or not a divorce occurred, which suggests that one consequence of divorce –
father absence – is not responsible for diﬀerences in mobility across family structures.
The correlation between family structure and mobility is of additional interest because it could
explain at least in part why intergenerational mobility between fathers and sons has increased in
the US over the last few decades (Corcoran, 2001; Fertig, 2003; Harding, Jencks, Lopoo, & Mayer,
2002; Mayer & Lopoo, 2001).2 Intergenerational mobility is often used as a measure of equality
of opportunity because it represents the degree to which one’s earnings are not pre-determined
by his/her parent’s earnings. Thus, the trend in father-son mobility may be interpreted as an
increase in equality of opportunity. Policymakers would like to believe that education programs
or redistributive policies are responsible. However, if mobility is higher in single and step parents
families, and the proportion of these family types are growing, then overall mobility could be rising
because of a compositional change in the make-up of American families.
The paper is organized as follows. I describe the data and the sample in the next section.
In section 3, I examine the eﬀect of family structure on earnings mobility without accounting
for selection. I ﬁrst develop a model which motivates the empirical strategy and then present
the ﬁndings. In section 4, I present results using hourly wage and education to lend support to
the interpretation of the earnings regressions in the previous section. In section 5, I account for
2In contrast to the studies just cited, Levine and Mazumder (2002) use the National Longitudinal Surveys
(NLS), the GSS, and the PSID to conclude that family income mobility has signiﬁcantly decreased between
1980 and the early 1990s.
2selection into family structure using two techniques to argue that the association between father-
child mobility and family structure is not causal. Finally, in section 6, I divide the sample into ﬁve
cohorts and show that father-son mobility does not rise signiﬁcantly when family structure controls
are included in the speciﬁcation.
2 Data and Sample
The data used in this study come from the core sample of the PSID, also called the Survey Research
Center sample.3 The PSID is well-suited for both intergenerational and sibling analysis because
families can be easily matched across and within generations. Although the motivations for this
paper center around fathers, I am also interested in the mobility with respect to mothers. If the
investment of a parent’s time is important, then the greater amount of time spent with a mother
relative to a father in a single-parent family would make mother-child mobility lower. Thus, I
consider both biological parents and children. I separate sons and daughters in the main analysis
since family structure may have diﬀerent eﬀects by gender (Powell & Parcel, 1997) and the child’s
gender may aﬀect his or her mobility. For the sibling ﬁxed eﬀects analysis, the sample includes
parents and their children of either sex because I do not want to impose a same-sex sibling restriction
on the sample. I also pool boys and girls for the instrumental variables analysis to increase sample
size.
Summary statistics on the sample of parents and sons and the sample of parents and daughters
are presented in Table 1. Family structure is characterized in this paper as the number of years
out of 18 that a child lives with both biological parents, with a single biological parent, and/or
3Because this sample was constructed as an equal probability sample, I do not include weights in this
analysis. There are concerns with regard to attrition given the length of the panel, however, Fitzgerald,
Gottschalk, and Moﬃtt (1998) analyzed the impacts of sample attrition in the PSID and did not ﬁnd evidence
of attrition bias in the intergenerational earnings relationship. Still, one might argue that a disproportionate
number of alternative families are lost to attrition since they have a high rate of residential mobility (Astone
& McLanahan, 1994).
3with a biological parent and a step-parent.4 Hereafter I will often refer to the latter two family
types as alternative families. Given that Wolfe, Haveman, Ginther, and An (1996) ﬁnd that one-
year ‘window’ variables can lead to unreliable estimates, the duration in an alternative family is
a more appropriate approximation of family structure.5 Because of greater variation, it also has
the advantage of greater precision. For each sample, three columns provide statistics on mutually
exclusive groups: those children who have never experienced an alternative family, those who have
experienced a single-parent family only, and those who have had a step parent.6 Consistent with
the ﬁnding that daughters have a greater likelihood of experiencing divorce (Dahl & Moretti, 2004;
Mammen, 2002; Morgan, Lye, & Condran, 1988), the proportion of those who have ever lived in
a single or step parent family in the daughter sample is ﬁfty percent higher than that of the son
sample.
Although intergenerational mobility has been studied with respect to many economic outcomes
including income, earnings, wealth, and occupation, it implicitly refers to some form of lifetime,
permanent economic status. I examine the eﬀects of family structure on three measures of labor
market productivity – earnings, hourly wage, and education – for two reasons. First, measures
4Although the PSID does not provide a family structure history for each child, the information can be
constructed using the marriage records of the parents. Thus, to be included in the samples used in this
paper, a child must have non-missing identiﬁcation information on both parents and non-missing marriage
data on at least one parent. According to Bumpass and Raley (1995), deﬁnitions of single-parent families
must be based on living arrangements rather than on marital status. Thus, every eﬀort is made to identify
cohabiting couples and assign them to the step family category. For instance, a household is believed to
involve a cohabiting couple if family type determined by the marital status of the mother is single, but the
head of the household is male. Blended families are not considered separately in this analysis. That is, one
family may include a step child of one parent and a biological child of both parents. These half-siblings are
no diﬀerent in this analysis than whole siblings where the divorce occurred after the oldest reached age 18
and a re-marriage took place before the youngest was age 18.
5A few studies ﬁnd that length of time spent in a single-parent family has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the like-
lihood of high school graduation (Wojtkiewicz, 1993; McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994) or the risk of premarital
birth (Wu & Martinson, 1993; Wu, 1996) and suggest that the number of family structure transitions is a
better indicator of the impact of family structure on children. In this analysis, I include a measure of step
family experience which should capture transitions as well as exposure.
6Note that most children who have lived in a step family would have ﬁrst experienced a single-parent
family. Also note that in ninety percent of the alternative families, the single parent is a single mother and
the step parent is a step father.
4associated with individuals rather than household measures of status are necessary for estimating
mobility with respect to both mothers and fathers, resident or non-resident. Second, earnings alone
are not a perfect measure of earnings potential because they depend not just on productivity or
human capital but also on labor supply choices. Of particular concern for this analysis, family
structure is related to labor force participation. Single mothers are more likely to work and given
that they work, work longer hours on average (Employment Characteristics of Families, 2002). This
is reﬂected in Table 1. Mothers have the highest average earnings when they are single and the
lowest average earnings when they are married to the biological father. In contrast, they have the
highest average wage and education (except in the son sample) in intact families, which implies that
single mothers work more. There is also some evidence that men’s hours may also be correlated to
family structure. Sons with step parents and their fathers have higher average earnings than any
other sons or fathers but have lower average hourly wages and educations than sons and fathers
from intact families. Thus, sons with step parents and their fathers must work longer hours than
the other groups. Because of these issues, using all three measures should increase the reliability
of the ﬁndings.
To minimize the bias derived from measurement error in the dependent variable, I proxy the
parents’ permanent status with the log of an average of several years of earnings or several years of
hourly wage observations, following Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992). Unlike Solon (1992) and
Zimmerman (1992) but instead following Reville (1995), I also proxy the child’s permanent status
with an average of several years of observations to reduce the variance. The parent’s earnings and
hourly wage are taken from the 1968 through 1978 interviews and the child’s adult earnings and
hourly wage are taken from the 1983 to the 1993 interviews.7 In Table 1, the numbers in square
7To be included in the sample, the child and both parents must have at least three years (and a maximum
of eleven years) of self-reported earnings in which his/her employment status is not retired, disabled, a
student, or other. In addition, the child must have been out of school for at least three years when the
earnings are observed and less than age 19 in 1968 (the beginning of the panel). Annual earnings are deﬁned
in this paper as all wages and salaries including overtime, tips, commissions, bonuses, and any other form
of payment for labor services received last year. Zero-earnings observations are included. Any observations
5brackets are the average number of annual earnings observations used to construct the permanent
earnings proxy. This number is lower for fathers and children from alternative families than for
those from intact families, which implies greater measurement error among alternative families.8
However, when I restrict the maximum number of observations such that the diﬀerence between
intact and alternative families is small, I ﬁnd no important diﬀerence in the results that follow.
The diﬀerential measurement error by family structure occurs because the samples are restricted to
biological parents and there are almost no observations for biological fathers who do not reside in
the survey household of the mother and the children. Thus, the father’s earnings and wage rate can
only be observed before a divorce. In contrast, mother’s earnings and hourly wage may represent
post-divorce economic status.9 However, if mothers’ earnings are restricted to pre-divorce earnings,
the results that follow are not aﬀected.
I also provide the children’s and the fathers’ average ages by family structure to demonstrate
that 1) the diﬀerence in the average age when earnings are observed for the child and the parent
is ten or more years and 2) that the alternative families are slightly younger on average. Because
of these factors, I control for the child’s age in all regressions and the father’s age in the average
earnings and average wage regressions.10
which have relevant variables imputed by ‘major assignment’ are excluded from the sample. The employment
status of wives were not recorded until 1975 hence I do not restrict mothers by employment status.
875% of intact fathers, but only 53% of divorced fathers, were observed for 8 or more years. At the other
end of the spectrum, 4% of intact fathers, while more than 18% of divorced fathers, were observed for only
3 years.
9Since mothers are more likely to work after a divorce, divorced mothers have more annual earnings
observations than intact mothers on average. 77% of intact mothers and 97% of divorced mothers were
observed for 8 or more years. At the other end of the spectrum, 3% of intact mothers and no divorced
mothers were observed in 3 years only.
10For the sake of parsimony, I do not control for mother’s age.
63 The Eﬀect of Family Structure on Earnings Mobility
3.1 The Model
The following framework motivates the estimation strategy presented in this paper. This model is
derived from Becker and Tomes (1979) modiﬁed to allow for alternative families and for a diﬀerence
in the impact of the earnings of mothers and fathers. Let us assume that a family involves a mother,
a father, and one child, where either parent can be non-resident.




family’s current consumption Ct¡1 and investment It¡1 in the child’s earning capacity, which gives




t¡1 = Ct¡1 + It¡1: (1)
The child’s earnings Wt are determined by the following function:
Wt = (1 + r)It¡1 (2)
+ µm(1 + ±mSt¡1)Wm
t¡1




where r is the return to human capital investment. µm and µf represent the degree to which the
child inherits endowments from his mother and father, respectively, which allow the child to convert
their earnings capacity into his own earnings capacity. The µ’s can also be thought to represent
the degree to which the child models his earnings-enhancing behavior based on his mother’s and
father’s earnings. Thus, unlike in Becker and Tomes (1979), the earnings of parents can aﬀect the
child’s earnings not only through the investment of their money, but also through role-modelling.
Without these terms in the child’s earnings production function, we would expect one dollar from
the mother’s earnings to have the same eﬀect as one dollar from the father’s earnings, which is
7contrary to ﬁndings in the literature. In particular, Couch and Dunn (1997) ﬁnd that the earnings
correlation with respect to mothers is lower than that with respect to fathers.
St¡1 represents whether (or how many years) the family has been a single or step parent family
and the parameters ±m and ±f indicate the degree to which growing up in a single or step parent
family aﬀects the child’s role-modelling or his ability to inherit endowments. Finally, Lt represents
the child’s ‘market luck’, which is assumed to be independent of Wm
t¡1 and W
f
t¡1 and known at the
time of the investment.
The family chooses It¡1 to maximize the Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U = (1 ¡ ® ¡ °St¡1)lnCt¡1 + (® + °St¡1)lnWt; (3)
where the parameter ® indicates the parents’ average taste for Wt relative to Ct¡1. The parameter
° indicates the degree to which the taste for investing in the child may diﬀer for families involving
non-resident fathers or single or remarried mothers.
Thus, this model allows alternative families to be diﬀerent from intact families in two ways:
1) the child may be more or less able to inherit the endowments (or role-model) depending on
±m and ±f, and 2) the family may be more or less likely to invest in the child depending on °.11
The parameters can represent a causal link between family structure and child outcomes or a link
caused by selection. For example, if ° < 0, we are not able to determine whether the parents invest
less because of their family structure, or their family structure is merely an indicator of parents
who invest less. The parameters ±p where p = fm;fg and ° can be positive or negative, however,
at least one of them is negative since we know from the literature that divorce is correlated with
negative outcomes (Amato & Keith, 1991; McLanahan, 1997; Grogger & Ronan, 1995; and Ginther
& Pollak, 2000).
This model allows the earnings of parents to have diﬀerent eﬀects on daughters versus sons
11Note that for simplicity there is no mechanism in this model for the child to be aﬀected by characteristics
of the step parent, although that may be the case in reality.
8given that there has been found to be a gender diﬀerence in mobility (Peters, 1992). In addition,
there is evidence that alternative family experience aﬀects children diﬀerentially by gender (Powell
& Parcel, 1997). In particular, family structure may aﬀect same-sex role-modelling through the
role-modelling terms in the child’s production function. For example, divorce may create a bond
between mothers and daughters which causes the daughter to emulate the mother. Another example
might be that step fathers have more inﬂuence on boys than on girls, which mitigates the mother’s
inﬂuence on her son after remarriage.
The ﬁrst-order conditions imply that the optimal choice of It¡1 is:





(1 ¡ ® ¡ °St¡1)
(1 + r)
[µm(1 + ±mSt¡1)Wm
t¡1 + µf(1 + ±fSt¡1)W
f
t¡1 + Lt]:
Substituting the optimal It¡1 into equation (2) produces:




+ (® + °St¡1)[µm(1 + ±mSt¡1)Wm
t¡1 + µf(1 + ±fSt¡1)W
f
t¡1 + Lt]:














+ ¯7St¡1 + ¯0 + ut;
where
¯1 = ®(1 + r) + ®µf
¯2 = °(1 + r) + (° + ®±f)µf
¯3 = °±fµf
¯4 = ®(1 + r) + ®µm
¯5 = °(1 + r) + (° + ®±m)µm
¯6 = °±mµm
¯7 = °Lt
¯0 + ut = ®Lt:
9¯2 and ¯3 represent the degree to which family structure aﬀects the intergenerational rela-
tionship between children and fathers and ¯5 and ¯6 represent the eﬀect of family structure on
mother-child intergenerational earnings mobility.12 If ±f (in the case of ¯2) and ° are of opposite
sign, the model does not allow us to predict the sign of ¯2.13 That is, we cannot predict whether
mobility with respect to either parent will be higher or lower in alternative families compared to
intact families.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Bearing this model in mind, we can study intergenerational earnings mobility and its interaction


















+ ½9sji + ½10s2
ji + ½11stepji + ½12Ai + ½0 + "ji;
The logarithm of the permanent earnings proxy for child i in family j (Wc
ji) is a linear function of
the logarithm of the permanent earnings proxies of each parent (W
f
j and Wm
j ), his or her exposure
to a single or step parent family (sji), interactions between parents’ earnings and duration in
an alternative family, and a vector (Ai) of the child’s median age (and age squared) when his/her
earnings were observed, the father’s median age (and age squared) when his earnings were observed,
and interactions between the family structure variables and the father’s age.14 This speciﬁcation
allows for the number of years in a single or step parent family to aﬀect mobility non-linearly and
the number of years in a step family (stepji) to have a diﬀerential eﬀect since children in step
12Note that the interaction in the third and sixth terms of equation (6) are not distinct from that in the
second and ﬁfth terms, and hence redundant, if St¡1 is a dummy variable which only takes the values zero
and one.
13Likewise, if ±m and ° are of opposite sign, we cannot predict the sign of ¯5 given this model.
14For the sake of parsimony, I do not control for mother’s age.
10families have likely experienced more transitions in family structure and there is the involvement of
another parent ﬁgure. This equation is identical to equation (6) from the model with the addition
of the step family indicator and the age controls.
Both mother’s and father’s earnings are included in the regression because running separate
regressions would ignore assortative mating. That is, if mother’s earnings are merely an indicator
of father’s earnings, then the importance of mother’s earnings will be exaggerated in a speciﬁcation
that does not control for father’s earnings. Finally, it is assumed that E("ji j zji) = 0 and
V ("ji j zji) = ¾2Ω, where zji is the vector of regressors listed in equation (7), the diagonal elements
of Ω are !2
i , the oﬀ-diagonal elements within families are !ij!ji, and the oﬀ-diagonal elements
across families are zero (i.e. the standard errors are adjusted for intra-cluster correlations at the
family level).
I estimate the coeﬃcients using ordinary least squares. If ½2 is negative (and assuming that
½3 = 0 and ½4 = 0), then each additional year living in an alternative family is associated with a
level of intergenerational earnings mobility with respect to the father that is ½2 higher.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Sons
Table 2 presents the mobility of sons with respect to their fathers and mothers using log average
earnings as the proxy for permanent earnings. The coeﬃcient in the top left-hand corner indicates
that the elasticity of sons’ earnings with respect to father’s earnings is 0.299.15 The bottom half
of Table 2 presents the coeﬃcients on mother’s log earnings and the family structure interactions.
The coeﬃcient on mother’s log average earnings indicates that the elasticity of son’s earnings with
respect to mother’s earnings, holding father’s earnings constant, is positive and signiﬁcant but only
15The magnitude of this coeﬃcient is smaller than the 0.4 estimate found by Solon (1992) and Zimmerman
(1992) because it involves a broader cohort. That is, both Solon and Zimmerman use son’s earnings from
the 1985 interview where this sample involves son’s earnings from the 1983 through the 1993 interviews.
When I restrict the son’s earnings to just those earnings observed in 1985, the elasticity of son’s earnings
with respect to father’s earnings is 0.464, which is more in line with the ﬁndings in the literature.
11ﬁve percent of the father’s coeﬃcient in size.
The coeﬃcient at the top of column (2) indicates that, for sons with zero years in a single
or step parent family, the earnings elasticity with respect to father’s earnings is 0.315. In this
column, I include a variable indicating whether the son ever lived in an alternative family (the
main eﬀect coeﬃcient is not shown) and interactions between this variable and the parents’ log
average earnings. The coeﬃcient on the father’s interaction is negative and signiﬁcant indicating
that sons with experience in an alternative family are more mobile with respect to their fathers
than sons who have only lived in a intact family. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient on the mother’s
interaction is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The family structure variable used in columns (3) through (5) is the number of years spent
in either a single or step parent family. Column (5) also includes a measure of the number of
those years which were in a step parent family. The diﬀerent speciﬁcations reveal that the eﬀect of
duration on father-son mobility is non-linear. That is, the eﬀect on father-son mobility of spending
one year in an alternative family relative to zero years is much larger than the eﬀect of spending 10
years relative to 9 years. The coeﬃcients on the mother’s interactions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, however the coeﬃcients on the interactions between father’s and mother’s log earnings
and years in a step family are negative, large, and signiﬁcant. Thus, the type of alternative family
has an eﬀect on son’s mobility with respect to both his mother and father as we would expect given
that children in step families have experienced more transitions in family structure than those in
single parent families only and there is the involvement of another parent ﬁgure.
Based on the coeﬃcients from the speciﬁcation in column (5), a son with three and a half years
in single-parent family – the average for the son and daughter samples – has an intergenerational
elasticity with respect to his father or his mother that is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. On
the other hand, a son with three years in a step parent family on top of three and a half years in
a single parent family has an intergenerational elasticity with respect to his father and his mother
12that is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. A possible explanation for the negative imputed
father-son elasticity is that, among sons with step parent family experience, those with the highest
earning biological fathers end up with the worst outcomes. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that the transitions in family structure matter in that these sons would have had more transitions
and potentially a dramatic transition if the fathers’ high earnings are an indication of the fall in
household income at the time of divorce. The negative mother-son elasticity may be explained by
a time investment story. That is, if a mother remarries and works long hours so that her earnings
are high, the time she has available to invest in her son is limited and his future earnings suﬀer as
a result.
3.3.2 Daughters
Table 3 presents the mobility of daughters with respect to their fathers and mothers. Column (1)
indicates that the daughters’ earnings elasticity with respect to their fathers’ earnings is 0.399.16
Unlike the sons sample, the coeﬃcient on mother’s log average earnings indicates that the elasticity
of daughter’s earnings with respect to mother’s earnings, holding father’s earnings constant, is zero.
Although it is not intuitive that mother’s earnings matter more to sons than daughters, the ﬁnding
is consistent with the fact that McLanahan (1985) ﬁnds no support for same-sex role modelling.
In column (2), the coeﬃcient on the interaction between the father’s earnings and the indicator
of ever having lived in an alternative family is negative and signiﬁcant indicating that daughters with
experience in an alternative family are more mobile with respect to their fathers than daughters who
have only lived in a intact family. In contrast, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between mother’s
earnings and alternative family experience is positive and signiﬁcant indicating that there is less
mother-daughter mobility among alternative families. Thus, although daughters do not appear
16The magnitude of this coeﬃcient is larger than that found in the small literature which analyzes father-
daughter earnings mobility; Altonji and Dunn (1991) estimate an elasticity of 0.22 and Peters (1992) es-
timates an elasticity of 0.11. However, both of these studies use the NLS instead of the PSID, which can
explain the diﬀerence. The PSID has been used in a study of daughter mobility with respect to family
income (Minicozzi, 1997) with an estimate of 0.41, which is more in line with the estimate presented here.
13to be modelling their mothers in intact families, mother-daughter role modelling appears to be
important in alternative families.
Similar to the father-son mobility ﬁndings, the coeﬃcients in columns (3) through (5) suggest
that the eﬀect of the number of years in an alternative family on both father-daughter and mother-
daughter mobility is non-linear. The type of alternative family has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on father-
daughter mobility but not on mother-daughter mobility.
Based on the coeﬃcients from the speciﬁcation in column (5), a daughter with three and a half
years in single-parent family has an intergenerational elasticity with respect to her father that is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and an elasticity with respect to her mother of 0.177 (signiﬁcant
at the 1% level). On the other hand, a daughter with three years in a step parent family and three
and a half years in a single parent family has an intergenerational elasticity with respect to her
father that is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level and an elasticity with respect to her mother
that is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The imputed elasticities for daughters given step family
experience follow the same pattern as the corresponding imputed elasticities for sons. That is, the
negative father-daughter elasticity with step family experience is consistent with the hypothesis
regarding the importance of transitions and the insigniﬁcant mother-daughter elasticity with step
family experience is consistent with the time investment story given that the mother-daughter
elasticity is positive without the step family experience.
These ﬁndings are consistent with those of Biblarz and Raftery (1993) who examine the eﬀect of
family structure on intergenerational occupational mobility using data from the 1973 Occupational
Changes in a Generation Survey and ﬁnd that father-son mobility is higher for alternative families.
In contrast, Peters (1992) uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) and ﬁnds that the
family characteristic ‘broken home’ does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on intergenerational earnings
mobility of sons or daughters with respect to their parents. However, if I use the family structure
variable in Peters (1992), a single snap-shot at age 14, instead of ‘any exposure’ or ‘years of exposure’
14as I do in this study, I also ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on mobility.
4 The Mobility of Hourly Wage and Education
The results in the previous section indicate that father-son and father-daughter mobility are higher
and mother-daughter mobility is lower in alternative families. However, the speciﬁcation used above
(laid out in equation (7)) is not without problems. First, there is measurement error in the proxies
for the parents’ permanent earnings which biases the coeﬃcients toward zero. Second, mother’s
earnings, even an average of several years, is not a good measure of mother’s earnings potential
given the uneven patterns of women’s labor supply. In fact, single mothers may have higher
earnings, as we observe in Table 1, only because their work hours are greater, not because they
have higher earnings potential. This problem also results in attenuation given that this earnings
proxy will confound mothers with valid estimates of their permanent earnings with mothers who
work irregular hours or who do not work every year.
To address these issues, I use two alternate measures of labor market productivity: hourly wage
and education.17 Education suﬀers from much less measurement error than average earnings given
that it is easy to quantify and recall. It also is not subject to issues related to labor supply. The
latter argument is the main advantage of using hourly wage. When the hourly wage of the parents
are used, the sample must be restricted to those who have some earnings. Thus, the hourly wage
provides a measure of earnings independent of the mother’s labor force participation and hours
decisions.
Table 4 presents the mobility of sons and daughters with respect to their fathers and mothers
using log average hourly wage and education as proxies for permanent earnings. I also include for
comparison the coeﬃcients from the regression using parents’ log average earnings from column (5)
of Tables 2 and 3.
17I do not control for the parent’s age and age squared when using education as I do for earnings and
hourly wage since the age-education proﬁle is relatively ﬂat by the mid-20s.
15For the son’s sample, the coeﬃcients on father’s hourly wage and the father’s wage interactions
in column (2) are similar to those on father’s earnings and the corresponding interactions in column
(1). Some of the estimates lose signiﬁcance because the sample is smaller in the wage regressions.
The coeﬃcients on mother’s hourly wage and, in particular, the coeﬃcients on the mother’s wage-
family structure interactions at the bottom of column (2) are diﬀerent from the corresponding
coeﬃcients in the earnings regression at the bottom of column (1), however they are not signiﬁcant.
In sum, this speciﬁcation provides some support for the claims that father-son mobility is higher
and that mother-son mobility is the same in alternative families.
For the daughter’s sample, the coeﬃcients on the mother’s hourly wage and wage interactions in
column (5) are similar in magnitude and sign to those in the earnings regression in column (4), but
the coeﬃcients on the father’s wage interactions are diﬀerent from those in the earnings regressions.
The similarity between mothers and daughters may stem from the relative similarity in a mother’s
and daughter’s labor supply choices. The diﬀerence in the father’s interaction coeﬃcients may be
due to a combination of less variability in daughters’ hourly wage compared to their earnings and
a lack of precision in the wage regression.
The coeﬃcients in the education regressions are consistent in general with the ﬁndings in the
other columns with some speciﬁc diﬀerences. First, mother’s education has a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on both son’s and daughter’s earnings, and the mothers’ coeﬃcients are half the size of
the fathers’ coeﬃcients, unlike the relatively small impact of mother’s earnings and hourly wage
compared with fathers’. Second, the eﬀect of family structure on mobility appears to be signiﬁcant
only for those with step family experience. That is, both sons and daughters living in step parent
families have higher mobility with respect to their fathers and lower mobility with respect to their
mothers and the diﬀerences are mostly signiﬁcant (not signiﬁcantly for sons).
Overall, these alternate speciﬁcations provide some support for the claim that father-child
mobility is higher and mother-daughter mobility is lower in single and step parent families. Thus,
16my interpretation of these alternate speciﬁcations is that the earnings regressions are not misleading
despite the fact that earnings, particularly mothers’ earnings, are a ﬂawed measure of economic
status.
5 Causality
Given that I ﬁnd a relationship between family structure and mobility, is it causal? That is, is it
another consequence of divorce that children are less like their fathers and more like their mothers
in terms of economic status, or is it the case that families who have high father-child and low
mother-child mobility are more likely to experience divorce? I address this issue in two ways. First,
following Grogger and Ronan (1995), and Case, Lin, and McLanahan (2000), I look at sibling
diﬀerences in alternative family experience using ﬁxed eﬀects (FE).18 Because this technique has
an important shortcoming which I describe below, I also conduct an alternate analysis which I
describe later.
5.1 Sibling Fixed Eﬀects
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where sji represents the number of years in a single or step parent family and Ai is a vector of
the child’s median age (and age squared) when his/her earnings were observed and interactions
between the family structure variables and the father’s age. This strategy identiﬁes the eﬀect of
family structure on intergenerational earnings mobility from the diﬀerences in the duration of spells
18I estimate the ﬁxed eﬀects in the regressions presented here, although I have also estimated the coeﬃcients
using sibling diﬀerences and have gotten similar estimates.
17living in an alternative family structure across siblings. The ﬁxed eﬀect should capture the time-
invariant unobservable characteristics of a family. If the family selected into their family structure
based on any of these unobservable characteristics, the estimated eﬀect of family structure should
not be driven by that type of selection.
Table 5 provides some statistics on diﬀerences across siblings since the sibling ﬁxed eﬀects
analysis hinges on the existence of these diﬀerences. Because of the age diﬀerences between siblings,
children in alternative families will have spent diﬀerent numbers of years in each family type. Of
those whose families were alternative at some time, on average the diﬀerence spent in alternative
families across siblings is between 3 and 4 years. This speciﬁcation assumes that the impact of
alternative families increases with exposure. Because duration in an alternative family type is
proportional to the age at disruption, this assumption could lead to a misinterpretation of the
results if there were other consequences of divorce related to age at disruption or strong birth order
eﬀects. However, I test for the presence of either of these factors and ﬁnd that they do not hold.19
There are two other noteworthy characteristics of the sibling sample. First, the alternative
families have a higher proportion of daughters because parents with a son are less likely to divorce
(Dahl & Moretti, 2004; Mammen, 2002; Morgan et al., 1988). Finally, because the sibling sample
does not include ‘only children,’ which make up a large proportion of single-mother households,
the family size statistics indicate that alternative families are smaller on average. That is, the
intact families are more evenly distributed across one, two, and three or more siblings where the
alternative families are highly concentrated among the one-sibling families.
19The ‘family stress’ hypothesis claims that the impact of divorce on young children involves behavioral
problems, where older children experience a withdrawal from the family. If this hypothesis holds, the mobility
of children with shorter durations in alternative families could in principle be more aﬀected by family
structure than children with longer durations. To test this possibility, I separate children by whether the
divorce occurred before or after age 10. I ﬁnd that the impact is signiﬁcant only for children who experience
the disruption at a young age, indicating that the data do not support the ‘family stress’ hypothesis. If
there were birth order eﬀects, lower birth order children, who would have had more limited experience with
alternative families, would always appear to do better than higher birth order children making the eﬀect of
alternative families appear worse. A test on children within intact families only indicates that older children
do not have any signiﬁcant advantage over younger children.
18Table 6 provides the results from the ﬁxed eﬀects regression. Because the identiﬁcation strategy
is based on the variation across siblings in the number of years in an alternative family, only the
duration measure of family structure is used in this analysis. The ﬁxed eﬀects regressions cannot
include the main eﬀect of father’s or mother’s earnings because it does not vary across siblings.20
I include the results from a standard OLS regression to demonstrate that the estimated eﬀect of
including the ﬁxed eﬀect is not the result of changing from a single-sex sample to the mixed-sex
sibling sample. As in the single-sex sample regressions, father-child mobility is higher in single and
step parent families, and step parent families particularly increase both father-child and mother-
child mobility. Because there are more daughters among those with alternative family experience,
in the sibling sample mother-child mobility is lower in alternative families, as is the case using the
daughters sample.
In the FE model, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between father’s earnings and alternative
family experience drops to a tenth the size of the OLS coeﬃcient and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.21 The FE coeﬃcient on the interaction between father’s earnings and step family
experience is not statistically diﬀerent from the OLS coeﬃcients. Thus, father-son mobility is the
same for siblings who spent diﬀerent spells in single parent families, but higher for the sibling
who spent more time in a step parent family. This implies that the association between any
alternative family experience and father-child mobility is driven by selection on time-invariant
family unobservable characteristics. This ﬁnding is not consistent with the idea that time away
from the father is the cause of the higher mobility. However, the step family interaction suggests
that time with a step father, or the transition into remarriage, may have a causal eﬀect on father-son
mobility.
20Father’s age also does not vary across siblings and so the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations do not include
father’s age as a control.
21However, the diﬀerence between the FE and the OLS coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. The statistical
signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients was estimated by bootstrapping the standard errors
and estimating the covariance between the ¯s. In row (2), the diﬀerence between columns (1) and (2) is
0.416 (0.510).
19In contrast, the FE coeﬃcient on the interaction between mother’s earnings and alternative
family experience is not statistically diﬀerent from the OLS coeﬃcients but the diﬀerence between
the FE and OLS coeﬃcients on the interaction between mother’s earnings and step family experience
is signiﬁcant. Thus, mother-child mobility is lower for siblings who have spent more time in an
alternative family and the eﬀect is larger for those with step family experience, which implies that
the correlation between family structure and mother-child mobility is not the result of this type of
selection.22 Since this does not rule out a causal explanation, it may be the case that increasing a
child’s time with a single or remarried mother strengthens their earnings correlation.
There is one important potential problem with interpreting the sibling ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients as
causal, particularly the coeﬃcient on the father’s interaction. Because I ﬁnd the eﬀect of years in an
alternative family to be non-linear in Tables 2 and 3, particularly with respect to fathers, the ﬁxed
eﬀects coeﬃcients may be downward biased. That is, the eﬀect of divorce on mobility is greatest
in the ﬁrst year after the divorce and has smaller incremental eﬀects in the years following (i.e. the
coeﬃcient on parent’s earnings interacted with years squared is signiﬁcant and the opposite sign of
the coeﬃcient on parent’s earnings interacted with years). Thus, the diﬀerence in the eﬀects across
siblings should be small because most of the eﬀect occurs for both siblings. The eﬀect of family
structure on mobility is more non-linear with respect to fathers than mothers, which implies that
the bias should be greater for fathers. This bias may be responsible for the small and insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient on the father’s interaction, rather than the selection of families into divorce.
22If daughters are likely to be the youngest sibling in divorced families with diﬀerent sex siblings, then the
coeﬃcient on the mother’s interaction with family structure might be biased upward. Because daughters
are more like their divorced mothers than sons (from Tables 2 and 3), the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation may
be picking up this gender diﬀerence rather than the age diﬀerence on which I argue identiﬁcation is based.
However, the youngest child is a daughter in only 41.4% of divorced families with diﬀerent sex siblings. In
fact, the oldest child is a daughter in 65.5% of these families, which suggests that, if anything, the coeﬃcient
on the mother’s interaction may be biased downward.
205.2 Instrumental Variables
Because of the potential downward bias of the sibling ﬁxed eﬀect technique, I also use instrumental
variables (IV) to investigate the causality of the relationship between family structure and mobility.
In particular, I instrument the number of years in a single or step parent family with the child’s
exposure to no-fault divorce laws. The number of divorces increased following the passing of no-
fault divorce laws (Friedberg, 1998) and thus the number of years the child spent in a state which
permitted no-fault divorces serves as exogenous variation in the probability that his/her parents’
divorce.
No fault divorce increased the ease of divorce by not requiring that one spouse demonstrate
a transgression by the other; instead, irreconcilable diﬀerences could be claimed as grounds for
divorce. According to the legislative details compiled in Gruber (2000), there were a dozen states
with no-fault divorce laws in place by 1950. A dozen more passed such laws in the 1950s and 1960s,
but the majority were passed in the 1970s, such that by 1985, all states permitted no-fault divorce.
Many states also simultaneously or subsequently permitted unilateral divorce, which increased the
ease of divorce by not requiring the consent of both spouses.
Several recent studies have examined changes in unilateral divorce laws (Friedberg, 1998; Gru-
ber, 2000; Wolfers, 2003) but I focus on no-fault divorce as the timing of these laws are more
relevant to the cohorts of children in this sample of the PSID (born between 1948 and 1968). Table
7 presents some summary statistics regarding the children’s exposure to no-fault and unilateral
divorce laws by family structure. For all family structure types, the mean number of years ex-
posed to no-fault is at least 4 years greater than the mean number of years exposed to unilateral
divorce. In addition, among intact families, the fraction of children who were never exposed to
no-fault divorce is half that of unilateral divorce. Stikingly, more than half of the children from
divorced families were never exposed to unilateral divorce laws. Because the variation in exposure
to unilateral divorce is so low for this sample, I look only at no-fault divorce laws.
21As expected given the literature on the eﬀects of divorce laws on divorce, the mean exposure is
greater for those children whose parents divorced. Further, the mean exposure is higher for those
children who have experienced a step family compared to those who have not which is consistent
with the fact that these children have longer average durations in alterative families.
Table 8 presents the results from this IV estimation procedure. I do not present the ﬁrst stage
coeﬃcients but they behave appropriately and the regression has an F-statistic of 16.17. I include
the results from an OLS regression for comparison. As above, the coeﬃcients in the OLS model
using this pooled sample of boys and girls are similar to those found with the single-sex samples.
The coeﬃcient sizes and signs on the father’s earnings and particularly the interactions, are
strikingly similar across the two regressions presented here. However, as is the usual case with
IV models, the standard errors are much larger than in the OLS model. As a result, only the
main eﬀect of father’s earnings is signiﬁcant in the IV model. In contrast, the coeﬃcient sizes on
mother’s earnings and its interactions are diﬀerent but the signs are the same and the signiﬁcance
is more in line with the OLS model. In particular, the interaction between mother’s earnings and
alternative family experience is positive and signiﬁcant, consistent with both the OLS coeﬃcient
and the sibling ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcient.
Thus, the IV analysis conﬁrms the causal interpretation of the mothers’ results – mother-child
mobility falls with each additional year in an alternative family. It also conﬁrms, although weakly
given the similar coeﬃcient size on the father’s interaction, that father-child mobility appears higher
in alternative families because of selection.
6 Family Structure and Mobility Trends
In the sections above, I show that there is a relationship between family structure and father-child
mobility, although it is likely not causal. In this section, I examine whether this relationship taken
together with the rising prevalence of alternative families in recent decades is responsible for rising
mobility between fathers and sons. The relationship need not be causal for rising mobility to occur.
22That is, father-son mobility may be higher because more fathers spend less time with their sons
because of a divorce, or because some fathers have changed – they both have a smaller inﬂuence
on their sons and select into divorce more.
To test the eﬀect of changing family structure on the trend in mobility, I construct a father-
son sample with no siblings (for consistency with the mobility trends literature) and divide it into
ﬁve cohorts. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 9. In the ﬁrst column, I report
the proportion of the sample which spent any time in an alternative family. Given the trend in
the US, this proportion increases across the cohorts. In the top panel, I estimate the father-son
intergenerational elasticity for each of the ﬁve cohorts; in column (2), I do not control for family
structure and its interactions with father’s earnings, while in column (3) I do. In the ﬁrst cohort,
the intergenerational elasticity is approximately 0.5 in both columns. Starting in the second cohort,
the intergenerational elasticity falls more dramatically in the column with no controls than in the
other column. The bottom panel displays the results of pooling all of the cohorts and including
a cohort indicator and an interaction between cohort and father’s earnings. The decline in the
intergenerational elasticity – represented by the coeﬃcient on the cohort interaction – is signiﬁcant
only in the column with no family controls and the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients on the cohort
interaction variable across the speciﬁcations is signiﬁcant. This evidence suggests that changes in
family structure may be responsible for half, if not all, of the rise in father-son mobility in the US
in recent decades.
7 Summary and Conclusion
In this study, I use the PSID to investigate the association between family structure and intergen-
erational earnings mobility. I ﬁnd that with each additional year in either a single or step parent
family, the mobility of biological sons and daughters are higher with respect to their father, and
the mobility of daughters is lower with respect to their mother. These ﬁndings hold up when the
parents’ economic status is proxied with their hourly wage and education. I also ﬁnd that the
23association between any alternative family experience and father-child mobility is explained by se-
lection on family unobservable characteristics where the correlation between family structure and
mother-child mobility is not.
These ﬁndings do not oﬀer support for the father-absence hypothesis since it appears that the
connection between fathers and children would have been weak whether or not a divorce occurred.
These ﬁndings also indicate that the overall level of father-son mobility has been rising because
there are more alternative families in recent cohorts. Averaging the mobility levels of both intact
families and alternative families make it appear that overall mobility is rising when in reality the
mobility levels of each type of family is not changing over the period. Taken together, these results
suggest that it is not divorce, or father absence in particular, that aﬀects father-child mobility but
rather that fathers have changed in recent decades. There are more fathers who are both divorcing
and having a reduced impact on their children’s outcomes. Normatively, since poorer couples are
more likely to divorce, higher mobility among single and step parent families suggests that these
children are not destined to be as poor as their fathers. That is, if fathers have changed for the
worse, it is to the beneﬁt of their children to have higher mobility.
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27Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sons Sample Daughters Sample
Always Only Any Always Only Any
Intact Single Step Intact Single Step
Percent 93.7 4.0 2.3 90.4 5.5 4.2
Mean Years 3.7 5.9 3.5 7.3
if in Category (0.5) (0.7) (0.4) (0.5)
Mean Child’s
Earnings $23,057 $22,435 $23,775 $22,685 $19,951 $15,759
(702) (2,128) (3,694) (612) (1,930) (1,716)
[8.6] [7.0] [6.8] [8.8] [7.2] [7.6]
Wages $10.72 $10.01 $10.06 $10.83 $9.46 $8.51
(0.28) (0.84) (1.19) (0.26) (0.86) (0.63)
Years of Schooling 12.8 12.8 10.6 12.9 12.7 10.5
(0.1) (0.6) (1.4) (0.1) (0.4) (0.9)
Mean Father’s
Earnings $31,542 $28,203 $35,432 $33,480 $27,908 $32,378
(774) (2,374) (3,636) (887) (1804) (2072)
[9.2] [6.9] [6.6] [9.0] [7.3] [6.2]
Wages $13.99 $12.44 $13.69 $14.39 $12.25 $13.61
(0.33) (1.02) (1.52) (0.36) (0.78) (0.89)
Years of Schooling 12.7 12.1 12.4 12.9 12.1 12.8
(0.1) (0.4) (0.6) (0.1) (0.3) (0.5)
Mean Mother’s
Earnings $4,400 $5,538 $5,252 $4,299 $6,503 $6,259
(227) (953) (1259) (216) (971) (974)
[8.7] [9.8] [9.4] [8.5] [9.4] [9.0]
Wages $6.91 $5.84 $6.58 $7.18 $6.42 $6.85
(0.16) (0.42) (0.51) (0.26) (0.42) (0.24)
Years of Schooling 11.5 12.0 9.8 12.5 12.0 11.9
(0.1) (0.6) (1.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.6)
Mean Child’s Age 30.7 27.6 27.1 30.2 27.1 26.2
(0.2) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2) (0.5) (0.4)
Mean Father’s Age 43.7 37.6 35.4 43.6 38.7 34.6
(0.3) (1.1) (1.3) (0.3) (1.5) (1.3)
Total Individuals 701 695
Total Families 465 468
Standard errors are in parentheses. The average number of annual earnings observations are in
square brackets. The earnings ﬁgures are deﬂated using the CPI and presented in 1984 dollars.
28Table 2: Sons Results
Dependent Variable: 3+ Year Average of Log Son’s Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
F’s Log Earnings 0.299** 0.315** 0.303** 0.314** 0.315**
(0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
F’s Log Earnings -0.295+
* Alt. Family (0.159)
F’s Log Earnings -0.030 -0.234** -0.255**
* Yrs in Alt. Family (0.080) (0.094) (0.079)
F’s Log Earnings 0.034+ 0.030
* Yrs2 in Alt. Family (0.020) (0.020)
F’s Log Earnings -1.402*
* Yrs in Step Family (0.646)
M’s Log Earnings 0.017+ 0.016 0.015 0.016+ 0.016
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
M’s Log Earnings 0.004
* Alt. Family (0.055)
M’s Log Earnings 0.008 -0.024 0.013
* Yrs in Alt. Family (0.015) (0.024) (0.036)
M’s Log Earnings 0.005 0.004
* Yrs2 in Alt. Family (0.004) (0.004)
M’s Log Earnings -0.147*
* Yrs in Step Family (0.065)
Sample Size 701
Heteroskedasticity-rodust standard errors adjusted for intra-cluster correlations are in parentheses.
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. In all speciﬁcations, son’s age, son’s
age squared, father’s age, and father’s age squared are included. In the speciﬁcations with inter-
actions, the family structure variables and the interactions between the family structure variables
and father’s age and father’s age squared are also included.
29Table 3: Daughters Results
Dependent Variable: 3+ Year Average of Log Daughter’s Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
F’s Log Earnings 0.399** 0.471** 0.442** 0.461** 0.465**
(0.065) (0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066)
F’s Log Earnings -0.528*
* Alt. Family (0.227)
F’s Log Earnings -0.062 -0.244** -0.276**
* Yrs in Alt. Family (0.040) (0.099) (0.080)
F’s Log Earnings 0.016* 0.046**
* Yrs2 in Alt. Family (0.008) (0.017)
F’s Log Earnings -0.436*
* Yrs in Step Family (0.236)
M’s Log Earnings 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
M’s Log Earnings 0.165**
* Alt. Family (0.069)
M’s Log Earnings 0.023** 0.148** 0.091**
* Yrs in Alt. Family (0.009) (0.053) (0.031)
M’s Log Earnings -0.019** -0.011*
* Yrs2 in Alt. Family (0.008) (0.005)
M’s Log Earnings -0.044
* Yrs in Step Family (0.028)
Sample Size 695
Heteroskedasticity-rodust standard errors adjusted for intra-cluster correlations are in parentheses.
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. In all speciﬁcations, daughter’s age,
daughter’s age squared, father’s age, and father’s age squared are included. In the speciﬁcations
with interactions, the family structure variables and the interactions between the family structure
variables and father’s age and father’s age squared are also included.
30Table 4: Alternate Speciﬁcations
Dependent Variable: 3+ Year Average of Log Child’s Earnings
Son’s Sample Daughter’s Sample
Parents’ Avg Avg Yrs of Avg Avg Yrs of
Economic Status= Earnings Wages Schooling Earnings Wages Schooling
F’s Economic Status 0.315** 0.434** 0.066** 0.465** 0.570** 0.088**
(0.076) (0.097) (0.018) (0.066) (0.097) (0.024)
F’s Economic Status -0.255** -0.204 0.065 -0.276** -0.086 0.011
* Yrs in Alt. Family (0.079) (0.199) (0.047) (0.080) (0.194) (0.039)
F’s Economic Status 0.030 0.019 -0.001 0.046** 0.003 0.004
* Yrs2 in Alt. Family (0.020) (0.032) (0.006) (0.017) (0.026) (0.003)
F’s Economic Status -1.402* -0.462 -0.109** -0.436* 0.076 -0.096*
* Yrs in Step Family (0.646) (0.362) (0.039) (0.236) (0.342) (0.043)
M’s Economic Status 0.016 0.086 0.030* -0.006 -0.071 0.043+
(0.010) (0.085) (0.015) (0.014) (0.111) (0.024)
M’s Economic Status 0.013 -0.101 -0.023 0.091** 0.111 -0.036
* Yrs in Alt. Family (0.036) (0.208) (0.044) (0.031) (0.262) (0.037)
M’s Economic Status 0.004 0.023 0.000 -0.011* 0.002 -0.001
* Yrs2 in Alt. Family (0.004) (0.032) (0.006) (0.005) (0.042) (0.003)
M’s Economic Status -0.147* 0.327 0.018 -0.044 -0.142 0.114*
* Yrs in Step Family (0.065) (0.322) (0.045) (0.028) (0.436) (0.053)
Sample Size 701 569 689 695 574 685
Heteroskedasticity-rodust standard errors adjusted for intra-cluster correlations are in parentheses.
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. In all speciﬁcations, the family
structure variables, child’s age, and child’s age squared are included. In the earnings and wage
speciﬁcations, father’s age, father’s age squared, and the interactions between the family structure
variables and father’s age and father’s age squared are also included.
31Table 5: Summary Statistics on Sibling Sample
Always Only Any
Intact Single Step
% in Category 91.9 4.7 3.4
% Daughters 48.5 56.6 63.2
Mean Diﬀerence in Years 3.2 3.6
(0.3) (0.4)
Max Diﬀerence in Years 11 11
% with No Diﬀerence in Years 4.9 0.0
% with 1 sibling 34.7 56.6 39.5
% with 2 siblings 33.4 30.2 21.1
% with 3+ siblings 31.9 13.2 39.5
Total Individuals 1125
Total Families 402
Standard errors are in parentheses.
32Table 6: Fixed Eﬀects Results
Dependent Variable: 3+ Year Average of Log Child’s Earnings
OLS FE
F’s Log Earnings 0.393**
(0.065)
F’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Alt. Family -0.379** 0.037
(0.086) (0.047)
F’s Log Earnings * Yrs2 in Alt. Family 0.068** 0.002
(0.029) (0.006)
F’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Step Family -0.483 -0.303**
(0.501) (0.098)
M’s Log Earnings 0.004
(0.009)
M’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Alt. Family 0.079** 0.096**
(0.028) (0.034)
M’s Log Earnings * Yrs2 in Alt. Family -0.006+ -1.290+
(0.004) (0.679)
M’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Step Family -0.108** 4.692+
(0.043) (2.613)
Sample Size 1125 1125
Heteroskedasticity-rodust standard errors adjusted for intra-cluster correlations are in parentheses.
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. In both speciﬁcations, child’s age,
child’s age squared, child’s sex, the family structure variables, and the interactions between the
family structure variables and father’s age and father’s age squared are included. In the OLS
speciﬁcation, father’s age and father’s age squared are also included.
33Table 7: Summary Statistics on Divorce Law Exposure
Always Only Any
Intact Single Step
Mean years of exposure to no-fault divorce laws 6.9 8.3 11.5
(0.2) (0.7) (0.8)
% with No Exposure 30.0 9.1 0.0
Mean years of exposure to unilateral divorce laws 2.2 3.3 3.8
(0.1) (0.5) (0.7)
% with No Exposure 66.8 53.0 55.6
Total Individuals 1396
Total Families 673
Standard errors are in parentheses.
34Table 8: Instrumental Variables Results
Dependent Variable: 3+ Year Average of Log Child’s Earnings
OLS IV
F’s Log Earnings 0.386** 0.266*
(0.058) (0.132)
F’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Alt. Family -0.295** -0.305
(0.063) (0.443)
F’s Log Earnings * Yrs2 in Alt. Family 0.043** -0.040
(0.015) (0.088)
F’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Step Family -0.395 -0.399
(0.262) (0.397)
M’s Log Earnings 0.005 -0.027
(0.009) (0.034)
M’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Alt. Family 0.058** 0.873*
(0.025) (0.425)
M’s Log Earnings * Yrs2 in Alt. Family -0.005 -0.115**
(0.003) (0.047)
M’s Log Earnings * Yrs in Step Family -0.075** -0.749
(0.030) (0.861)
Sample Size 1396 1396
Heteroskedasticity-rodust standard errors adjusted for intra-cluster correlations are in parentheses.
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. In both speciﬁcations, child’s age,
child’s age squared, child’s sex, the family structure variables, father’s age, father’s age squared, and
the interactions between the family structure variables and father’s age and father’s age squared
are included.
35Table 9: Father-Son Trends
Elasticity of Son’s Earnings w.r.t Father’s Earnings
Dependent Variable: 3+ Year Average of Log Child’s Earnings
Proportion of
Sample in No Family Family
Alt. Families Controls Controls Diﬀerence
’68-’85 Cohort 3.1 0.497** 0.485**
[384] (0.101) (0.104)
’69-’86 Cohort 4.4 0.320** 0.359**
[389] (0.081) (0.084)
’70-’87 Cohort 4.4 0.184* 0.295**
[385] (0.080) (0.081)
’71-’88 Cohort 4.6 0.202** 0.373**
[393] (0.081) (0.085)
’72-’89 Cohort 4.6 0.080 0.230*
[391] (0.078) (0.109)




Cohort Interaction -0.091** -0.049 0.042**
(0.027) (0.033) (0.017)
The cohort label refers to the years in which the father’s and the son’s earnings began being
observed (i.e. ‘68-‘85 Cohort refers to the fathers observed between 1968 and 1972 with sons
observed between 1985 and 1989). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses in
the middle two columns. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses on the diﬀerence term
in the last column. + signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. The number in
the square brackets is the sample size. Earnings are age-adjusted.
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